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Section 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provides
that an outdoor advertising sign may not be located within 500 feet of an
interchange (the "no-sign zone").
(LexisNexis Supp. 2003).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A)

Section 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) has two parts: first,

establishing the regulatory restriction (500 feet from the interchange) and, second,
defining how the restriction is to be measured (from the sign to the nearest point of
the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the
main-traveled way). Both in establishing the parameters of the interchange and
then determining the point of widening, the Court must be guided by the
definitions provided in the Act and relevant regulations.
UDOT would obfuscate the appropriate analytical framework by urging the
Court to interpret the operative statute in reverse order. It urges the Court to
determine the point of pavement widening in the context of the measurement
clause and then use that point to define the parameters of the interchange. Under
UDOTs argument, the measuring mechanism not only effectively swallows the
regulatory requirement but also allows UDOT to ignore the definitions of "point of
widening" and "interchange" added to the Act in 1997.

Rules of statutory

construction do not allow such a result. UDOT's position therefore should be
rejected.
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L

T H E POINT O F WIDENING IDENTIFIED BY UDOT FAILS TO GIVE E F F E C T
TO THE 1997 AMENDMENTS TO THE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING A C T ,

UDOT argues that "[t]he beginning or ending of pavement widening marks
the boundary of the interchange/' and that the point of pavement widening does
not occur until the Traffic Lane1 fully merges into the northbound lanes of 1-15.
Brief of Appellee at pp. 8, 9. UDOT's position can be sustained only by failing to
give effect to the Utah Legislature's 1997 amendments to the Outdoor Advertising
Act.
A.

T H E COURT M U S T GIVE E F F E C T TO THE 1997 AMENDMENT.

Prior to 1997, the Act gave no guidance as to the meaning of the phrase
"point of pavement widening." In 1997, the Utah Legislature amended the Act,
defining the term "point of widening" as,
the point of the gore or the point where the intersecting lane begins to
parallel the other lanes of traffic, but the point of widening may never be
greater than 2,640 feet from the center line of the intersecting highway of
the interchange or intersection at grade.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-502(19) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
UDOT argues that reliance on the statutory definition is misplaced because
it ignores the existence of the word "pavement" in section 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A),
1

In its opening brief, YESCO defined "Traffic Lane" as the entirety of the traffic
lane that allows traffic to transition from Antelope Drive to the northbound lanes
of 1-15. The Traffic Lane turns northward from Antelope Drive and ends when it
fully merges into 1-15, a distance of over 2,900 feet from the intersection of 1-15
and Antelope Drive. The Traffic Lane includes both an on-ramp and an
acceleration lane (under YESCO's reading of the statute and regulations) or only
an on-ramp (under UDOT's interpretation). Brief of Appellant Young Electric
Sign Company ("Brief of Appellant") at pp. 13-14; Brief of Appellee at p. 8 &
Addendum A.
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which, according to UDOT, would render this seemingly all-important word
superfluous.

Brief of Appellee at pp. 9-10. UDOT's argument fails for two

reasons.
First, the existence of pavement is inherent from the context of the statute.
The statutory definition speaks in terms of intersecting lanes and interstates.
Interstates, on-ramps, and acceleration lanes are never unpaved. For instance, the
Traffic Lane from Antelope Drive and the three northbound lanes of 1-15 initially
are separated by unpaved ground. As the Traffic Lane turns north and begins to
parallel the three northbound lanes of 1-15, the pavement for 1-15 widens to meet
the pavement from the Traffic Lane, creating a solid field of pavement covering
the three northbound lanes of 1-15 and the Traffic Lane. This is the point of
widening urged by YESCO.

The point urged by UDOT is the point where,

looking back from the sign location toward the center of the interchange, the
pavement of the Traffic Lane fully merges into the northbound lanes of 1-15. The
existence of pavement is inherent from the statutory context and its practical
application. UDOT's argument therefore is a distinction without a difference.
Second, the Court's obligation to give effect to the amendment outweighs
any concern that arises because of the omission of the word pavement from the
Act's new definition. When a court interprets an amendment, the legislature is
presumed to know the prior construction of terms in the original act.

An

amendment substituting a new term or phrase for one previously construed
indicates that the judicial or executive construction of the former term or phrase
Reply Brief of Appellant - Page 3

did not correspond with the legislative intent and that a different interpretation
should be given the new term or phrase. State of Utah v. Westerman, 945 P.2d
695, 698 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Further, words and phrases used in a statute, if
also defined by statute, must be construed according to that definition. Utah State
Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (1995). See also Grynberg v.
Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, f30, 70 P.3d 1 (when term defined within
statute, court should look to definition for guidance to interpret statute). Finally,
In accordance with the general rule of construction that a statute
should be read as a whole, as to future transactions the provisions
introduced by the amendatory act should be read together with the
provisions of the original section that were reenacted or left unchanged, in
the amendatory act, as if they had been originally enacted as one section.
Effect is to be given to each part, and they are to be interpreted so they do
not conflict. . . . If the new provisions and the reenacted or unchanged
portions of the original section cannot be harmonized, the new provisions
should prevail as the latest declaration of the legislative will.
NJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22:34
(6th ed.)
"It is the duty of the court to give due effect to the evident purpose of the
amendment." Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 248 P. 490
(Utah 1926). It is evident that the Legislature intended for the term "point of
widening" to have meaning. That term is used only in the more-wordy phrase
"point of pavement widening" and nowhere else in the statute. The only way to
comply with applicable rules of statutory construction, and avoid rendering the
definition superfluous, is to interpret "point of widening" and "point of pavement

Reply Brief of Appellant - Page 4

widening" as synonymous.

The approach urged b) UDOT would render the

definition meaningless and should be rejected.
B.

ONLY THE POINT OF WIDENING IDENTIFII/III HY
THE REQUIRED STATUTORY DEFINITIONS,

YESCO M E E T S

Each party has identified a point of pavement widening. The point of
widening urged by YESCO is the point where the paving for the through lanes ol

measures 1,164 from feet the intersection of Antelope Drive and I-13 See Brief of
Appellant at p. 14; R54; see also Addendum, Tab C.
1 >; i v <stne nt

UDOT argues, and

widening does not occui until the point at which the Traffic Lane completely
merges into the three northbound lanes of
Addendum A * p 1 ^
definition

^
iyy/.

T

* *" See Brief of Appellee at 7-9 &

reaches

/vs defined by the statute, "the point of pavement

widening may never be greater than 2,640 feet from the center line of the
intersecting highway of the interchange or intersection at grat
ANN «>
;' " '?-7- M)2{ I1')

'I lie disiiii I court recognized its obligation to utilize the

definition but failed to acknowledge that the point it identified exceeded the
maximum distance limitations imposed by that definition,

T

undisputed f'uf flte pom' id'MilHied (»\ bolli IIIX )'I IIKI the district court is located
2,900 feet beyond the intersection of Antelope Drive and 1-15 and therefore
beyond the maximum distance from the center of the interchange permitted by the
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statute. See Brief of Appellant at Addendum, Tab C [R54] and Brief of Appellee
at Addendum A.
This Court therefore is faced with determining which of two possible points
of widening control the placement of YESCO5s proposed sign. The definition
added in 1997 makes the decision a clear one. The point urged by UDOT is more
than 2,640 feet from the center of the interchange. Only the point of widening
identified by YESCO meets the requirement of the statute.
IL

THE

TRAFFIC

LANE INCLUDES BOTH AN ON-RAMP AND AN

ACCELERATION LANE.

From the point of widening identified by YESCO, the Traffic Lane
continues on for another 1,738 feet -just short of 6 football fields - before it fully
merges into the three northbound lanes of 1-15.

Using the definition of

"acceleration or deceleration lanes" promulgated under the Outdoor Advertising
Act, YESCO asserts that the Traffic Lane turns from an on-ramp to an acceleration
lane, as defined by the regulations, 500 feet past the point of widening identified
by YESCO. Because an interchange does not, by definition, include acceleration
lanes, the point at which the on-ramp becomes an acceleration lane marks the end
of the interchange. The no-sign zone continues for another 500 feet past that
point. See Brief of Appellant at pp. 13-19; R54 (see also Addendum C).
2

UDOT claims that YESCO's representative conceded that YESCO's proposed
sign location fell within 500 feet of the point of pavement widening. See Brief of
Appellee at 7-8. UDOT's argument is misleading. A review of the full deposition
testimony establishes that YESCO's representative only agreed that the proposed
sign location was located within 500 feet of a point of widening as defined by
UDOT. He did not agree that UDOT's interpretation was accurate. See R134-35.
Reply Brief of Appellant - Page 6

UDOT

without explanation or analysis, that no acceleration lane

exists at the interchange of 1-15 and Antelope Drive. See Brief of Appellee at 9.
UDOT's position is inconsistent with the relevant icguLtlions.
Regulahuii;, |jiutiitj|jvtteci under the Outdoor Advertising Act define
"acceleration and deceleration lanes" as "speed change lanes created for the
purpose of enabling a vehicle to increase or decrease

i

nil, f t j i i

i

mi

, in inn t'lni

U>IY"

>r

s

UTAH ADMLV

K.

933^3^

(LexisNexis 2004). It is evident that a traffic lane that extends for such a great
length past the point where the on-ramp meets and begins to parallel
lanes before it: i lerging int : • the interstate traffi :: is designed for the purpose of
allowing traffic to increase speed to merge into the interstate lanes. Cf Hathaway
v. Marx, 439 R2d 850, 851 (Utah 1968) (highway that is widened 1

le

both before and af'lei an mleisedmi' IU.UI flm ,„i ihnihil nil I ,IISft fed ] provides an
extra lane for acceleration and deceleration in entering or leaving the highway).
UDOT wholly fails to articulate why a lane that extends for the length of
six. football fields, with Hie oli\i.»ir. piupose of allowing Iniffit (. \\M\\ sp<vd I
merge into the interstate lanes, does not fit the express definition of an acceleration
lane as articulated by Rule 933-2-3(2). Instead, UDOT argues the regulation does
not mean what it says. According to III M 11 Rule 9 W-J • '»<'.') defines a single Lim

3

A mile measures 5,280 feet. It therefore follows that 1/ iu oi a mile is 528 feet.
If the highway is widened 1/10th of a mile both before and after the intersecting
roadway, the total distance widened would be 1,056 feet.
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that parallels the interstate lanes and runs from an on-ramp to the next available
exit ramp. See Brief of Appellee at pp. 8-9 & Addendum C. UDOTs strained
interpretation is inconsistent with the rule's language and internal structure. See
Brief of Appellant at pp. 23-25.4 Nothing in the language of the rule or the statute
prevents an acceleration lane from gradually merging into the through lanes of the
interstate, and the Court may take judicial notice that this is a common highway
configuration. UDOT's reading of the regulation does not "'sensibly conform[] to
the wording and purpose' of the regulation" and should be rejected. State of Utah
v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, f 24, 93 P.3d 420 (citation omitted).
UDOT also argues that YESCO treats the terms on-ramp and acceleration
lane as synonymous, a reading that UDOT claims robs it of the ability to control
the placement of outdoor advertising signs. See Brief of Appellee at 8-9. UDOT's
characterization of YESCO's position is inaccurate.

YESCO consistently has

recognized that the Traffic Lane consists of two parts - the on-ramp and the
acceleration lane. The on-ramp begins at the point where the Traffic Lane leaves

4

UDOT complains that YESCO did not raise below its argument that UDOT's
interpretation of the statute is more properly classified as an auxiliary lane, as
defined by UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-53.5(l)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). UDOT
fails to note, however, that it did not raise its interpretation of the regulation until
its final reply brief filed with the district court and then only in a footnote. [R148,
150, 156] YESCO was not entitled to any further briefing at that point. Further,
YESCO consistently has taken the position that the Traffic Lane becomes an
acceleration lane 500 feet past the point of widening identified by YESCO.
Interestingly, UDOT makes no effort at this point to distinguish its interpretation
of Rule 933-2-3(2) from the definition of an auxiliary lane found in section
41-5-63.5 (which also is excluded from the definition of an interchange). See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-502(9) (LEXISNEXIS SUPP. 2003).
Reply Brief of Appellant - Page 8

Antelope Dri\ e and extends to a point 500 feet past the point of widening
identified by YESCO. At that point, the Traffic Lane becomes an acceleration
lane, See Brief of Appellant at lo- IU

"YTSf 'O icuigni/es tin,: nn r.imp ;mil (lie

acceleration lane as separate parts of the Traffic Lane. It does not treat them as
synonymous.
UDOT's claim that YESCO's position leaves it \ itl it. :>i it
nun tin,1 plain Hill ul

n l i I Him advertising signs is solved by recognizing that the

Traffic Lane at issue includes an acceleration lane, as defined by the regulations.
The Traffic Lane becomes an acceleration lane 500 leet past (tie poinl ul *vidt;nmg.
'"'HI ili,M 11ciii11», iln iiit«NnJi"iiifi'c r m \ \

i n zuiie extends 500 feet past the

interchange and into the area of the acceleration lane. Interpreting the statute in
this manner does not effectively eliminate all control over billboard spacing
around inieiiiiciiiges, as uDO'l .ti^ui", Inn insirad rffivihrlv implements it in
accordance with the language of the statutes and rules.
By contrast, UDOT seeks to judicially extend the no-sign zone beyond this
point, and

language

n me

administrative rules, by imploring the Court to ignore rules of construction as they
apply to the statute and the administrative rules and further to cast a blind eye to
the statute's requirement lli.il Hi f I'liiiil ul \ 'idrmn
from

hill nu inure ihitti ? fVfii) hvl

intersection of Antelope Drive and 1-15. It is unnecessary for the Court

to disregard the will of the legislature to arrive at a sensible meaning of the statute
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and rules, as UDOT urges. The interpretation offered by YESCO harmonizes all
parts of the statutory and regulatory language.
Finally, UDOT argues that the "beginning or ending of pavement widening
marks the boundary of the interchange." Brief of Appellee at 8. Once again,
UDOT fails to recognize the impact of the 1997 amendments, which defined the
term "interchange" or "intersection" as
those areas and their approaches where traffic is channeled off or onto an
interstate route, excluding the deceleration lanes, acceleration lanes, or
feeder systems, from or to another federal, state, county, city, or other
route.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-502(9) (emphasis added). The fallacy of UDOT's
position is evident when analyzing both potential fact patterns before this Court:
first, those where an acceleration lane exists and allows traffic to increase speed to
merge into the interstate lanes and, second, those where an acceleration (or
auxiliary) lane begins at an on-ramp and continues as a parallel lane of traffic until
the next available off-ramp.
First, in those instances where an acceleration lane exists for the purpose of
allowing traffic to increase speed to merge into the through lanes of the interstate
(as an acceleration lane is defined by Rule 933-2-3(2)), under UDOT's argument,
the point of widening would not occur until the acceleration lane fully merges with
the interstate lanes. If the point of widening defines the end of the interchange,
then the acceleration lane will necessarily be within the interchange, a result not
allowed by the statute. Thus, unless UDOT intends categorically to deny the
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existence of an acceleration lane in each and every instance, UDOT's approach
ignores the definition of interchange, which specifically excludes acceleration
lanes.
as UDOT alleges, an acceleration lane does not merge into the
freeway but instead continues as a parallel lane until the next interstate exit (an
auxiliary lane as defined by Utah I ode Aim h 4 I -0 "«i t ^1 11

i* n (In JMHIII ot

witktititjt», uinln ni III H IT's scenario, will not occur until the acceleration lane drops
off at the next off-ramp. In that event, the entirety of the acceleration lane, as
UDOT reads the regulation, is part of the interchange
Interchanges).

This interpretation clearly

conflicts with the statutory language that excludes acceleration lanes from any
interchange. UDOTs interpretation as applied to either acceleration liun sieiiai n
irliuh mi .i sli lined inl</i|iirliihi>ii il lli< sl.iltifc .iiul regulations and wholly defies
logic.
III.

THERE IS N O CONFLICT BETWEEN T H E OUTDOOR ADVERTISING A< i
AND THE UTAH-FEDERAL AGREEMENT.

) Outdoor Advertising Act provides that,
72-7-:

Utah-Federal Agreement - Severability Clause.
n>i

As used in this section, "Utah-Federal Agreement" means the
agreement relating to outdoor advertising that is described in Section
72-7-501, and it includes any modifications to the agreement that are signed
on behalf of both the state and the United States Secretary of
Transportation.
(2) The provisions of this part are subject to and shall be superseded
by conflicting provisions of the Utah-Federal Agreement.
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(3) If any provision of this part or its application to any person or
circumstance is found to be unconstitutional, or in conflict with or
superseded by the Utah-Federal Agreement, the remainder of this part and
the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances shall not
be affected by it.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-515 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added).
UDOT opines that the interpretation of the Outdoor Advertising Act
advanced by YESCO conflicts with the measurement mechanism contained in the
Utah-Federal Agreement. See Appellee's Brief at 11, 14-15. A comparison of the
relevant provisions of the Utah-Federal Agreement and the Outdoor Advertising
Act demonstrates no such conflict.
A,

T H E RELEVANT LANGUAGE OF THE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING A C T
AND THE UTAH-FEDERAL AGREEMENT IS SUBSTANTIVELY
IDENTICAL.

The Utah-Federal Agreement contains only a single provision that
addresses the placement of outdoor advertising signs in relation to an intersection.
That single provision reads,
No sign may be located on an interstate highway or freeway within 500 feet
of an interchange, or intersection at grade, or rest area (measured along the
interstate highway or freeway from the sign to the nearest point of the
beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to
the main-traveled way).
UTAH ADMIN. R. 933-5-2(111), Spacing of Signs 2(b) (LexisNexis 2004).
This provision of the Utah-Federal Agreement is substantively identical to
section 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) of the Outdoor Advertising Act. Because there is no
conflict between the language of section 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) and the Utah-
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Federal Agreement, no "conflicting provision" exists, and the severability
provision of section 72-7-515 does not come into play.
UDOT nonetheless suggests that, based on section 72-7-515, the Court
should ignore the Outdoor Advertising Act's statutory definition of "point of
widening" and "intersection" because the Utah-Federal Agreement does not
contain similar definitions. See Appellee's Brief at 11. The language of section
72-7-515 should not be read so broadly.
The Utah-Federal Agreement contains several definitions.
ADMIN. R. 933-5-2(I)(A)-(I) (LexisNexis 2004).

See UTAH

To show a "conflicting

provision," UDOT would have to point to definitions of "intersection" and "point
of widening" in the Utah-Federal Agreement that conflict with those found in the
Outdoor Advertising Act.

The Utah-Federal Agreement defines neither term.

Again, without those definitions, no "conflicting provision" exists that would be
subject to the severability provision of section 75-7-515.
Further, UDOT has failed to provide any analysis or other basis for its bald
assertion that the meaning ascribed to the terms "intersection" and "point of
widening" by the Utah Legislature and the administrative rules varies from that of
the Utah-Federal Agreement. Indeed, there is no basis for such a claim. There
simply is nothing in the statute or the Utah-Federal Agreement that requires the
Utah Legislature to refrain from providing greater clarity to its citizens and
agencies.
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B.

UDOT CANNOT RELY ON THE SEVERABILITY CLAUSE TO AVOID
T H E DEFINITIONS SET O U T IN THE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING A C T ,

Unable to point to any actual conflict between the Outdoor Advertising Act
and the Utah-Federal Agreement, UDOT argues that YESCO's interpretation
conflicts with the measurement standard set out in the Utah-Federal Agreement.
The argument is, again, unsupported and without merit.
First, UDOT does not explain why YESCO's interpretation creates the
conflict that UDOT claims.

Its position is nothing more than a conclusory

statement unsupported by any helpful analysis.
Second, any effort to discern a basis for UDOT's position fails.

The

regulatory requirement of both the Outdoor Advertising Act and the Utah-Federal
Agreement provides that signs may not be located within 500 feet of an
interchange.

Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) and UTAH

ADMIN. R. 933-5-2(111), Spacing of Signs (2)(b). Each then provides a measuring
mechanism by which the 500 feet is measured. The measuring mechanism is
nothing more or less than a mechanical exercise. It does nothing to define the
parameters of the interchange and comes into play only after those parameters are
first established. See Brief of Appellant at 26-27.
This reading is underscored by the structure of the Utah-Federal
Agreement. There, the measuring mechanism is set out in a parenthetical that
follows the regulatory requirement. Under UDOT's approach, the parenthetical
clause would operate with little or no regard for the regulatory portion of the
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regulation. The only thing that matters is whether UDOT can identify a point of
pavement widening within 500 feet of the proposed sign. While UDOT may find
that approach easier, and more to its liking, it is not the proper analysis. UDOT
first must identify the boundaries of the interchange, using the definitions dictated
by the Outdoor Advertising Act. Once those boundaries are determined, UDOT
may then measure to determine whether the proposed sign falls within 500 feet of
those boundaries. To hold otherwise allows a measuring mechanism set out in a
parenthetical to swallow the relevant regulatory language.
IV,

YESCO H A S N O T REQUESTED A NONCONFORMING SIGN LOCATION,
UDOT also argues that its regulations do not allow a nonconforming sign to

be relocated or removed. UDOT's argument is a red herring. YESCO is not
requesting a permit to move a sign from one non-conforming location to another.
YESCO removed the original sign at the request of the landowner. YESCO then
applied for a permit to erect a new sign on the north end of the landowner's
property. Brief of Appellee at 3; R. 32, 39, 77, 82, 84-85; 2, 20, 62, 76, 82. The
new sign site proposed by YESCO conforms with the requirements of the current
statute. The sign will be located 800 feet past the no-sign zone for the Antelope
Drive/Northbound 1-15 Interchange. There is no violation of the statute.
UDOT makes the nonsensical argument that, because YESCO's original
sign was "non-conforming," it did not have the right to request a permit to erect a
new sign in a conforming location. See Brief of Appellee at 13. A review of Rule
933-2-5, on which UDOT relies, demonstrates that it has the ultimate goal of
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removing, in a fair and reasonable manner, nonconforming signs as they become
old, damaged, or unkept. UTAH ADMIN. R. 933-2-5 (LexisNexis 2004). YESCO
removed a nonconforming sign, furthering this goal. It would thwart the purpose
of that regulation if a company were punished for removing an old,
nonconforming sign by thereby being prohibited from constructing a sign on a
new site that fully conforms with the existing statute.
CONCLUSION
Two issues ultimately determine the appropriate application of the Outdoor
Advertising Act - the parameters of the interchange and the point of pavement
widening. UDOT's position on both issues must be rejected because (a) the point
of widening on which it relies falls outside the 2,640 foot limitation set out in the
Act's definition and (b) UDOT fails to recognize the existence of the acceleration
lane, as defined by the relevant regulation. Only the parameters of the interchange
and the point of widening identified by YESCO give effect to the 1997
amendments to the Act and thus satisfy both the controlling statutory and
regulatory language.

The decision of the district court therefore should be

reversed, and UDOT should be directed to issue the sign permit requested by
YESCO.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of November, 2004.

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
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Heidi E. C/Leithead
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